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Habermas on Modernity and Postmodernism 
Guenter Zoeller 
THE TITLE of this ambitious contribution to the interpretation of our 
times is carefully chosen: "discourse" here means the reflective thematiza 
tion of an issue that is up for critical discussion; "philosophical discourse" 
refers to an ongoing debate among philosophers; and "modernity" indi 
cates the topic of this discourse: the status of Western culture since the En 
lightenment. Furthermore, Habermas distinguishes philosophical moder 
nity from modernism in the arts and from a more casual sense of modern 
times. 
The occasion for Habermas' assessment of the history of philosophical 
reflection about modernity is the emergence of a cluster of movements in 
contemporary French thought that consider themselves to have gone be 
yond modernity in proclaiming and celebrating a post-Enlightenment or 
post-modern age. Habermas responds to postmodernism in philosophy 
with an account of the modernist ancestry of philosophical postmodern 
ism. He shows that the critique of modernity has always been an integral 
part of philosophical modernity itself and that the radical disjunction be 
tween postmodernism and modernity is predicated on a reduced and inade 
quate understanding of philosophical modernism's self-critical potential. 
In what follows, I will recapitulate the main points of Habermas' ac 
count of the philosophical discourse of modernity, then summarize his 
metacritique of philosophical postmodernism as it reflects Habermas' own 
theory of modernity, and finally assess the importance of Habermas' con 
tributions for the wider debate on postmodernism. 
I 
In his theory of modernity, Habermas closely follows Hegel's analysis of 
the Enlightenment (23-44). Tracing the origins of philosophical moder 
nity as far back as the Renaissance and the Reformation, Hegel had in 
sisted that the extent of our emancipation from religious and secular tradi 
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tions did not become evident until late in the eighteenth century, particu 
larly in Kant's radical critique of the metaphysical tradition. For Hegel, 
Kant was the first to fully articulate the modern principle of "subjectivity" 
(Hegel's term), with its doctrines of individualism (the infinite worth of 
the individual), criticism (the problematic status of traditions), autonomy 
(the independence of human agency from external moral authority), and 
idealism (the omnipresence of reason in the world). The immediate reac 
tion to Kant's philosophy revealed the ambivalent character of modernist 
philosophical accomplishments. Enlightened reason provided freedom 
from traditional authorities but left as their only replacement abstract ra 
tional principles of theoretical, moral-practical and aesthetical knowledge 
with no significant integrative cultural force. Reason as systematized by 
Kant appeared one-sided and irrevocably separated from what it excluded 
from its domain. Post-Kantian philosophy was thus based on opposition, 
"Entzweiung" as Hegel put it, and called for some new form of unifica 
tion. 
Among the various innovative proposals for an emendation of Kantian 
philosophy, Hegel's own theory of the absolute as all-encompassing, self 
realizing spirit emerged as the most influential and challenging contribu 
tion to the post-Kantian philosophical debate. According to Hegel, what 
was called for was not an abandonment of the Kantian project of a critique 
of reason but rather its radicalization. Enlightenment reason ("Verstand") 
with its insistence on abstract opposition had to be integrated into a more 
comprehensive, speculative, form of reason ("Vernunft") that could even 
unify the opposition between unity and difference. Through his notion of 
speculative reason, Hegel was thus able to think of what Enlightenment 
reason excluded as other than reason as reason's own other. 
For Habermas, the idea of including otherness within absolute reason 
provides the starting point for three distinct movements in nineteenth 
century thought: Hegelian orthodoxy with its conservative insistence on 
the rationality of the actual (Fight Hegelians), the revolutionary trans 
formation of speculative philosophy into a philosophy of concrete, hu 
man, political practice (Left Hegelians), and Nietzsche's utter rejection of 
the very concept of autonomous reason governing either the actual world 
or a possible, unalienated world (51-74). In Habermas' reconstruction, 
Nietzsche emerges as the "turning point" at which the philosophical dis 
course of modernity enters its postmodern phase (83-105). Before Nie 
152 
tzsche, the main participants in that discourse shared Kant's and Hegel's 
belief in reason's potential to provide its own justification through cri 
tique. Nietzsche provides an alternative concept of rationality, replacing 
the subjective genitive in the phrase, "critique of reason," with an objec 
tive genitive. Reason no longer enacts its own critique but is critiqued 
from without instead. No longer self-sufficient, reason becomes a function 
of the other, the non-rational. 
The two main lines of contemporary philosophical development that 
Habermas traces to Nietzsche are Heidegger's History of Being together 
with Derrida's Grammatology, on one side, and Bataille's rehabilitation of 
the ecstatic together with Foucault's Theory of Power, on the other (131? 
293). In Heidegger, the overcoming of "subjectivity" takes the form of a 
neo-mystical philosophy of unscrutinizable origins ("Ursprungsphiloso 
phie"), a direction continued by Derrida's emphasis on writing as opposed 
to 
speech and on the unidentifiable as opposed to what can be repeated 
identically. In Bataille, the authority of practical reason as it appears in the 
rationalization of modern life, is critiqued in the name of the suppressed 
and marginalized erotic experience. Foucault's critique of modernity, 
finally, dislocates the human being from its position as the subject of his 
tory to a resultant in a depersonalized field of institutional forces. 
Habermas thus articulates the two phases of the philosophical discourse 
of modernity in terms of two competing conceptions of reason: the Hegel 
ian notion of reason qua spirit as substance and subject of everything actual 
and the Nietzschean concept of a merely instrumental rationality that 
stands in the service of some other force, such as life, Being, or power. 
Even the neo-Marxist critique of reason presented by the Frankfurt School 
is subsumed under this bipartite scheme (106-130). For Habermas, Hork 
heimer's and Adorno's work on the relapse of reason into mythical irra 
tionality ("dialectic of Enlightenment") and their insistence on the neces 
sary distortedness of reason follows Nietzsche's reductionist project of a 
natural history of culture ("genealogy of morals"). 
II 
In Habermas' presentation, the analyses of the various stages in the philo 
sophical discourse of modernity always include a principal critique of the 
position under consideration. As regards Hegel and the Right and Left 
Hegelians, Habermas agrees with the postmodernist rejection of the meta 
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physical view of history as the self-realization of some supra-human ra 
tional spirit. He does not, though, endorse the absolute rejection of the 
centrality of reason in human self-understanding. 
Habermas' metacritique of the postmodern critique of rationality em 
ploys three distinct arguments that he mobilizes in various combinations 
against each of the thinkers under discussion. In an argument that draws 
on the long-standing tradition of refuting the skeptic, Habermas points 
out the precarious status of a position that totally rejects privileging any 
position and thus cannot account for the alleged validity of itself, except 
by way of contradiction (276ff.). The second argument charges the con 
temporary detractors of reason with collapsing the ineluctable Kantian 
distinction between genesis and validity, between questions concerning 
the factual origin of some claim and its possible justification on grounds 
that cannot be reduced to its de facto origin (119ff.). The third anti-post 
modernist argument, also Kantian in origin, amounts to the charge that 
Nietzsche and his successors are blurring the principal distinction between 
the three equiprimordial spheres of claim and adjudication: the cognitive 
sphere in which claims concerning factual correctness are raised and adju 
dicated, the moral-legal sphere in which claims concerning normative cor 
rectness are raised and adjudicated, and the aesthetic-critical sphere in 
which claims regarding artistic authenticity are raised and adjudicated (19, 
50). 
For Habermas, these three arguments against philosophical postmod 
ernism constitute a minimalist theory of rationality that attempts to re 
place the unacceptable substantialist notion of reason as universal subject 
with a conception of rationality based on reason as the necessary standard 
of interaction between subjects that rely on each other for the recognition 
and adjudication of their claims (294-326; 336-367). What Habermas 
proposes is a paradigm shift away from the notion of reason as centered 
around an isolated individual (either a concrete Ego or a world spirit) to 
wards a concept of reason as centered around supra-subjective, though not 
supra-human communicative interaction. Habermas sees himself inspired 
to this paradigm shift by indications of the foundational role of intersub 
jectivity that he identifies at various stages of the philosophical discourse of 
modernity. However, Habermas concedes that neither Hegel nor Marx 
nor Husserl nor Heidegger pursued the idea of communicative rationality 
to the theoretical radicality that he himself had taken it in his earlier two 
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volume opus, The Theory of Communicative Action. Given that The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity employs the new theory of rationality 
as 
the standard for competing views on the nature of the modern in general 
and the rational in particular, the anti-postmodernist argument of the 
book is predicated on Habermas' conviction that the universality of ra 
tional standards can be maintained in a theory that no longer invokes 
metaphysical guarantees. 
HI 
Habermas' sustained insistence on the emancipatory potential of reason 
provides a welcome antidote to the fatalist, if not apocalyptic tones that 
characterize much contemporary Continental thought with its idolatry of 
such unscrutinizable entities as 
"Being," "Power," or "Writing." Deline 
ating a third way between the Hegelian and the Nietzschean alternatives 
allows Habermas to expose the non sequitur in the move from the rejection 
of classical-modernist rationality to the adoption of an essentially a-ration 
alist philosophical postmodernism. Of particular interest should be Haber 
mas' assessment of the generic distinction between philosophy and litera 
ture (185-210). In the face of Derrida's and his American followers' at 
tempts to remove any principal boundaries between literature, literary 
criticism, and philosophy, Habermas insists on the diversity of the cultural 
functions exercised by each of the genres in question. In an argument that 
draws on his earlier neo-Kantian distinction between the three equipri 
mordial value spheres (science, morality and law, art and criticism), Ha 
bermas distinguishes the world-constituting function of art, its capacity to 
bring about innovative perspectives, from the innerwordly problem 
solving capabilities of the other two dimensions of possible claims. The 
aesthetization of all experience, as implied in the pantextualism of the Der 
rideans, is thus seen as threatening the balance in the cultural system of 
complementary functions; in particular, the dimension of critique accord 
ing to cognitive and normative standards is seen as dissolving into an un 
limited proliferation of interpretations beyond any standard of adjudica 
tion. 
In discussing the respective tasks of literary criticism and philosophy, 
Habermas concedes that the rhetorical character of philosophy is indis 
pensable given philosophy's task of mediating between spheres of highly 
specialized knowledge ("expert cultures") and the dimension of unre 
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flectedly functioning societal existence ("life world"). But for Habermas, 
the reliance on literary devices in philosophical argumentation does not 
affect its obligation to aim at the solution of problems, just as the bent to 
wards philosophy in literary criticism is no substitute for the genuine task 
of a critique of artistic experience and its objects. For the contemporary 
cultural situation with its penchant towards interdisciplinary and inter 
generic outreaches, this conviction amounts to the insight that the pre 
requisite for mediation between the various spheres of cultural and intel 
lectual activity is not the collapse of disciplinary boundaries but rather 
their recognition as orientation marks in the exchange and mutual assess 
ment of claims and their attempted justifications. 
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